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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This thesis traces the development of doctrine for command relationships in amphibious warfare. The study examines the command relationships employed in landing operations through World War I, with emphasis on Santiago in the Spanish-American War and Gallipoli in World War I as the driving forces behind joint and naval doctrine development. From this background, the thesis outlines the efforts of the Joint Board and Marine Corps Schools to codify their doctrine, primarily in the interwar years. The joint process led to *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* and *Joint Overseas Expeditions* of 1927 and 1933, predecessors to Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*. Naval doctrine begun by the Marine Corps Schools became the Navy's *Fleet Training Publication 167, Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1938*, predecessor to Joint Publication 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*. The thesis then examines the employment of that doctrine, and the doctrinal changes and lessons that resulted, in three major amphibious operations, WATCHTOWER (Guadalcanal), ICEBERG (Okinawa), and CHROMITE (Inchon). The study concludes with a discussion of the relevance of the historical development to today's doctrinal issues and provides recommendations for further research.

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A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE FOR COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JAMES JOSEPH HENRY IV, LCDR, USN
B.S., University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN, 1984
M.S., Naval Postgraduate School, Monterrey, CA, 1992

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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

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

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

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

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE FOR COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, by LCDR James J. Henry IV, 113 pages.

This thesis traces the development of doctrine for command relationships in amphibious warfare. The study examines the command relationships employed in landing operations through World War I, with emphasis on Santiago in the Spanish-American War and Gallipoli in World War I as the driving forces behind joint and naval doctrine development. From this background, the thesis outlines the efforts of the Joint Board and Marine Corps Schools to codify their doctrine, primarily in the interwar years. The joint process led to *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* and *Joint Overseas Expeditions* of 1927 and 1933, predecessors to Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*. Naval doctrine begun by the Marine Corps Schools became the Navy's *Fleet Training Publication 167, Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1938*, predecessor to Joint Publication 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*. The thesis then examines the employment of that doctrine, and the doctrinal changes and lessons that resulted, in three major amphibious operations, WATCHTOWER (Guadalcanal), ICEBERG (Okinawa), and CHROMITE (Inchon). The study concludes with a discussion of the relevance of the historical development to today's doctrinal issues and provides recommendations for further research.

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Great appreciation is owed to the staff of CARL Library archives, particularly John Rogers and Rusty Rafferty, and especially to Ms. Kerry Strong of the Marine Corps University Research Archives. These experts guided my search through countless documents, without which this thesis would not have been possible.

Finally, a special thanks goes to my wife, Kathy, for her long distance love and encouragement.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

Current amphibious doctrine had its origins in procedures primarily developed in the period between World War I and World War II. The motivation for developing these procedures can be traced as far back as the Spanish-American War, which showed that "the fleet was incapable of sustained operations even in waters as close as those of Cuba."[1] Additionally, the experience of the British failure at Gallipoli in 1915 led to "a general conclusion was that large scale amphibious operations against a defended shore . . . were almost certain to be suicidal."[2] The American military, especially the United States Marine Corps, was not deterred by the British failure at Gallipoli, convinced that the problems encountered were due to "faulty doctrine, ineffective techniques, poor leadership, and an utter lack of coordination between the services."[3] Matters were further complicated during the inter-world war period by the continued growth of airpower in military operations, a rapidly evolving capability of both the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as the air arm of the Army. The problem of command and control became three dimensional, adding air forces to those on the sea and on the land.

The procedures developed during this period have been tested, in part or whole, under fire in numerous amphibious operations. These included: assaults in World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, and Panama; demonstration in the Persian Gulf War; noncombatant evacuation operations in Somalia, Albania, and the Congo (then Zaire); peace enforcement in Kosovo; and humanitarian assistance in the Philippines and Turkey. These are but a few examples of the hundreds of amphibious operations conducted in the past sixty years.

Amphibious operations form an essential element of United States military strategy. Such operations allow for power projection through the introduction of a land combat force into an area of operations from a highly maneuverable "sea base." Vital to the conduct of any military operation is the relationship between commanders involved. Such relationships in amphibious operations are especially complicated by the participation of maritime, land, and air forces. Therefore, the question of proper command relationships in amphibious operations may be said to have national military implications.

Over the last few years, the Navy and Marine Corps have been struggling with the issue of the "proper" command relationship in their efforts to update the governing

doctrine for the conduct of amphibious operations, Joint Publication 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*. The essential difficulty in this struggle is whether to retain the Commander Amphibious Task Force and Commander Landing Force (CATF and CLF) relationship of the current amphibious doctrine, or to revise the doctrine to a supported and supporting relationship in line with Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*.

The current doctrinal relationship is essentially one where the CATF, a Navy officer, is assigned overall operational command for the amphibious portion of the operation. The CLF, either a Marine Corps or Army officer, is responsible to CATF for operations ashore, until he has sufficient combat power established to continue operations. At that point, a transfer of command authority from CATF to CLF is conducted and the amphibious operation ends. The exception to this relationship is that the commanders are coequals during the planning of the operation.

In accordance with Joint Publication 0-2, a supported and supporting relationship is established when "one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force."[4] This command relationship is not as structured as the CATF and CLF relationship. The commander establishing the supported and supporting relationship

specifies the purpose of the relationship, the priorities of support, and the degree of authority the supported commander exercises over the supporting commander.

The doctrinal argument discussed previously has delayed a major revision to Joint Publication 3-02 for a number of years, with the likelihood that it will not be published for at least another two years. The impact of such a delay is felt far beyond this single publication. Nearly all Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrinal and tactical publications rely heavily on Joint Publication 3-02 as the keystone for amphibious operations. Additionally, the United States is responsible for Allied Tactical Publication 8, NATO's principal amphibious doctrine, which is primarily based on Joint Publication 3-02 and is also greatly in need of revision.

Problem Statement

This research will examine the development of the current doctrine, specifically with regard to command relationships, which essentially occurred in the years leading up to, and during, World War II. Perhaps such an examination may assist those working to update Joint Publication 3-02 in their efforts by shedding light on the reasons for development of the current doctrine and

discerning any relevant lessons that might be taken from the employment of the doctrine in operations.

The primary question of interest then is, How did the doctrine for amphibious command relationships develop up to and through World War II?

In order to address this question, a number of subordinate questions must be answered:

What amphibious operations did the United States undertake prior to World War II? What was the nature of operations involving the Navy and Marine Corps, and the Navy and Army? What, if any, specific command relationship doctrine existed prior to the interwar period? Was there a different relationship between Navy and Army, and Navy and Marine Corps?

What was the impetus for development of the command relationships following World War I? Were there specific events that led to the formation of doctrine by the U.S. military?

Did the command relationships employed during various World War II and Korea amphibious operations follow the doctrine that was developed? Were there any changes to command relationships doctrine resulting from those operations?

Scope of the Study

This thesis will primarily be focused on development of amphibious doctrine prior to World War II and its employment during World War II and Korea. The study will be limited to this period, as the primary changes to amphibious doctrine since World War II have dealt with changes in technology, not the essentials of the doctrine.

The development of joint doctrine regarding supported and supporting command relationships will not be evaluated due to the scale of the problem. Additionally, this examination of doctrine development will not address doctrinal efforts taken by other nations, such as Great Britain. The thesis will also not concentrate on technical developments during this period, of which there were many, again where they may have a direct influence on the question of command relationships. Finally, this thesis will not attempt to specifically address the applicability of current doctrine to evolving concepts.

Methodology and Organization of the Study

The answers to the questions previously asked will be found through research into the history of amphibious operations. This research will focus on original documents, accounts, and discussions that delineated and debated the

development of amphibious doctrine. Therefore, the historical method of research will be employed in this thesis.

The second chapter of this study will provide a brief historical background on the employment of armed forces in amphibious operations through World War I. The result of this background will be to describe amphibious command relationships prior to development of specific doctrine. The third chapter will review the development of amphibious doctrine addressing command relationships. The majority of this development effort took place during the period between World War I and World War II. However, joint publications issued before World War I will also be investigated for their bearing on subsequent doctrine. The fourth chapter will look at the application of command relationship doctrine during World War II and Korea, through examination of case studies examining specific operations. The final chapter will present any conclusions and any considerations that might be applicable to the efforts being undertaken today to update amphibious command relationships doctrine.

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[1]Jeter A. Isely and Phillip A. Crowl, *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951; reprint, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1979), 21 (page citations are to the reprint edition).

[2]Ibid., 20.

[3]Ibid., 5.

[4]U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, 24 February 1995, in *Joint Electronic Library* [CD-ROM] (Washington: Government Printing Office by OC Incorporated, 1999), III-10.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

Introduction

Operations involving the landing of ground forces ashore from ships have long held a place in the conduct of warfare. As early as 490 B.C., the Persians mounted a campaign against Greece, which included the landing of a "combatant landing force, including the ships' soldiers, of fifteen thousand men as a maximum"[1] at Marathon to engage the Athenian garrison. This operation proved to be a failure for the Persians, due to poor tactical decisions and the operational decision to reembark half their Army to assault Athens, which "was clearly the opportunity for which Miltiades [Greek commander-in-chief] was waiting."[2] However, it clearly indicates that the landing of troops from the sea was not a unique concept to World War II.

American military forces have participated in such landing operations literally from the beginnings of the nation. Following are a few examples of naval landing operations, that is, those involving the Navy and Marine Corps, followed by joint military landing operations, those involving Army and Navy forces. Finally, this chapter will review the two primary events that drove development of

doctrine, the operations at Santiago during the Spanish-American War and at Gallipoli during World War I.

Naval Operations

The earliest American landing operation undertaken, in early 1776, was an attack against a British fort at New Providence in the Bahamas. The Naval Squadron, under the command of Commodore Esek Hopkins, carried about 270 Marines commanded by Captain Samuel Nicholas. The British were using the Bahamas as a logistics base to support their naval campaign along the Atlantic coast. Seizing these supplies would provide a boost to American efforts, while denying the supplies to the British. Two hundred and seventy Marines and fifty bluejackets (Sailors) were landed under cover of naval guns, with no losses. Captain Nicholas commanded this landing force, reporting back to Commodore Hopkins. The British were taken by surprise, did not oppose the landing, and quickly ceded the fort and supplies to the American force.[3]

For nearly the next century, the Navy and Marine Corps were involved in numerous landing operations. Each of these involved small-landing parties consisting of Marines and Sailors permanently assigned to Navy ships. These were relatively minor undertakings, conducted in conjunction with

Navy operations in the Mediterranean, Caribbean, and Pacific. A Marine officer, under the overall command of the Navy officer directing the operation, generally led the landing parties, as Marines made up the majority of the landing parties.

During the war against Mexico in 1846-47, the Navy Home Squadron under the command of Commodore David Connor, followed by Commodore Matthew C. Perry, formed landing brigades of Marines and Sailors under the command of Navy captains. These brigades, varying in size from 500 to about 1,500 men, conducted landings to support the defense of Point Isabel and were employed in the Tabasco River to occupy and bring about the surrender of a number of ports. These naval operations were in support of larger Army plans for conduct of the ground campaign. In the Pacific, Commodore J. D. Sloat, commander of the Pacific Squadron, employed small landing forces of Marines, Sailors, and California volunteers, which "were largely responsible for the capture of California."[4] Each of these landings faced limited or no resistance.

In the Civil War, naval landing forces were again used to precede some Army operations, such as when naval bombardment forced the abandonment of a Confederate fort at Port Royal, which was then occupied by a Marine landing

force until the later arrival of an Army landing force. As with previous operations, such landings were conducted under the overall command of the Navy officer in charge.

Following the Civil War, increased emphasis was placed on the employment of the Marine Corps as an advance base force. As Navy ships were modernized, more and more support was required when the fleet was to operate for extended periods or at great distance from the United States. In areas where permanent United States bases were not available, the Navy would require a considerable fleet of supply and support ships. A temporary advance base would be required from which to station this support. The Marine Corps became the preferred "accompanying land force to seize, fortify, and defend such a base . . . [and] to deny such advance bases to the enemy."[5] This task became the primary mission of the Marine Corps and formed the basis for the island-hopping campaigns of World War II.

These examples included operations that were naval in nature, that is, the forces involved were from the Navy and Marine Corps. The following section will provide examples of early Army and Navy or joint operations.

Joint Army and Navy Operations

The first major operation involving the Army and Navy occurred in March 1847 at Vera Cruz, during the war with Mexico. General Winfield Scott followed orders from the Secretary of War to "repair to Mexico, to take command of the forces there assembled."[6] Such a directive would seem to indicate that General Scott was placed in overall command of the expedition, and he conducted early coordination with Commodore Connor to determine their responsibilities and develop the plan for attack. Four divisions under the command of General Scott embarked in Texas on transports procured by the Army. These transports were then convoyed by the Navy to an anchorage near Vera Cruz, where the troops transferred to smaller Navy ships for the landing. Ten thousand of General Scott's troops landed over the course of a few hours, facing no opposition. This force laid siege to the city, and following bombardment of artillery and naval guns, captured the city.

In early 1862, Brigadier General Ambrose Burnside embarked an Army division for an amphibious landing on Roanoke Island. This would be the starting phase of an effort to control the inland waterways leading to Norfolk. In this case, not only did the Army procure the transports, but it also acquired and manned its own gunboats. Shore

bombardment and attacks on Confederate gunboats, by both Brigadier General Burnside's gunboats and Commodore Louis M. Goldsborough's North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, led to a nearly unopposed landing and capture of the island. Similar was the operation at Fort Fisher in 1864 and 1865, in which Rear Admiral David D. Porter, now in command of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, supported the Army force under Major General Godfrey Weitzel, then Major General Alfred H. Terry. Here again the Army was responsible for procuring their transports. General Grant personally gave General Terry clear instructions "that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, . . . defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities."[7] Despite some problems with the original plan, resulting in an aborted initial assault in December 1864, and severe weather in January 1865, the attack was successful, largely due to "wholehearted cooperation" [8] between General Terry and Admiral Porter.

With these examples of early naval and joint operations as a background, the following section will examine events at Santiago during the Spanish-American War. These events were to lead to better efforts at interservice cooperation.

Santiago--Impetus for Army and Navy Cooperation

The Spanish-American War of 1898, in particular the efforts to take the port of Santiago, underscored the need to codify the relationships between the Army and Navy in joint operations. While Rear Admiral William T. Sampson enforced a blockade of the port, Major General William R. Shafter assembled his forces at Tampa, to embark in a fleet of merchant transports. Following considerable delays, caused primarily by lack of embarkation planning, the transports sailed for Cuba. While the troop transports were under Army control, the Navy provided protection at sea, shore bombardment and assistance with the landing. Upon arrival of the troop convoy, problems started as Rear Admiral Sampson and Major General Shafter disagreed over where to put the troops ashore. The landing itself was far from ideal, with insufficient boats, disorganized debarkation, and merchant captains who refused to close the beach for fear of shore battery fire despite the Navy escort. The Army staff even lost a brigade, which had been employed in "a diversionary landing attempt several miles down the coast and then became temporarily forgotten in the general confusion of the main landings."[9] Fortunately, the landing was unopposed, and the Army was successfully put

ashore. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate the movement to Cuba and initial operations.

For the next two weeks, Major General Shafter and Rear Admiral Sampson exchanged numerous telegrams and letters between themselves and the War and Navy Departments, respectively, regarding the means to finally capture the port. Shafter wanted the fleet to force their way into the harbor, bombarding the forts at the entrance on the way in. Sampson was quite willing to fire on the forts, but told the General, "If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance, I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail."[10] Sampson wanted the Army to take out the enemy guns in the forts, so that minesweeping equipment could clear the entrance before bringing the fleet into the harbor. Despite a message forwarded by the Secretary of the Navy a few days after the landing, which stated:

> The President has just issued this order to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy: - "General Shafter and Admiral Sampson should confer at once for co-operation [*sic*] in taking Santiago after the fullest exchange of views, they should determine the time and manner of attack." The Department desires you to carry out these instructions. . . . Signature, LONG.[11]

Sampson and Shafter continued to exchange messages, but did not meet in person.



Figure 1a.



Figure 1b.

Figure 1. Santiago Operation. Source: U.S. Military Academy, Department of History, Map Library [online]; available from http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/Atlas%20Page.htm; Internet; accessed 2 May 2000.

Despite these problems, after two weeks the Spanish surrendered the port. However, disagreements continued over representation at surrender negotiations, who should take charge of capture Spanish vessels and even who received credit for the victory.

The lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy led the United States "to a faint understanding that all was not entirely well within its own military establishment."[12] Part of the problem was that the coordination point in the event of disagreement between the War and Navy Departments was the president himself. Additionally, there was "no directive, or doctrine, or manual to govern their [Army and Navy] relationships with each other."[13] The result was the establishment of the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, which eventually evolved into the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Board was intended as a means to effect "preparations that would enable the Army and Navy to co-operate [*sic*] promptly and effectively at the first alarm of war."[14] Such preparations would include the development of joint war plans and doctrine to govern operations in which the Army and Navy worked together. As will be seen in the next chapter, such doctrine eventually included the command relationships between Army and Navy commanders in joint landing operations.

Having reviewed a primary driving force behind the eventual development of joint doctrine, the following section will review the amphibious operation at Gallipoli in World War I. This operation has largely been cited as the stimulus for the Marine Corps to develop naval amphibious doctrine.

Gallipoli--Motivation for Marine Corps Development of Landing Procedures

Unlike the Army and Navy, the Marine Corps focused on the British efforts in the Dardanelles early in World War I, probably the first true amphibious assault against a defended shore, as their motivation for doctrine development. The campaign began with an unsuccessful naval-only operation, in which an English-French squadron of battleships, cruisers, and minesweepers, under the command of Vice Admiral Sackville Carden and later Rear Admiral John de Robeck, were to bombard the forts on Gallipoli, then clear the way up the Dardanelles to Constantinople. After observing the final naval operation, British General Ian Hamilton "convinced him [de Robeck] that a joint ground-sea effort would be necessary."[15] General Hamilton would command the landing force, operating in cooperation with the naval commander. Although cooperation was the norm for British command relationships in joint operations, in

reality General Hamilton developed the operation plan, including the times and places for landings, later presenting the plan to naval commanders.[16]

General Hamilton assembled his landing force at Alexandria, far from the naval staff with the squadron at Lemnos. This prevented any significant joint planning. Nonetheless, the British managed to land their ANZAC (Australia-New Zealand Army) Corps against no opposition. Portions of the 29th Infantry Division, however, faced serious resistance, but managed to reach the beach. That was about as far as the assaulting forces managed to proceed. Turkish defenders, entrenched on the high ground, dominated the landing areas, effectively preventing the assaulting force from advancing for months. Figure 2 depicts the defenses and initial landings at Gallipoli. By the time the British decided to withdraw, amazingly without casualty during that operation as the Turks did not press their advantage, "the paucity of joint planning, rehearsal and logistics coordination spelled continual failure, frustration and appalling losses of men and equipment."[17]

Many in the United States felt the British failure at Gallipoli spelled the end of amphibious operations. General Douglas MacArthur, who called landings "the most difficult of operations" and stated "that armies and navies will



Figure 2. Gallipoli Assault. Source: U.S. Military Academy, Department of History, Map Library [online]; available from http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/dhistorymaps/Atlas20%Page.htm; Internet; accessed 2 May 2000.

undertake them with extreme reluctance in the future," [18] perhaps best expressed these feelings. Many others did not agree. The Marine Corps Schools made an extensive study of Gallipoli, focusing on several key areas, including failures of command, control, communications, logistics, and equipment. In order to fulfill their mission to secure advance bases for the fleet, some Marines realized that offensive operations similar to those at Gallipoli would be required and that "the Marine Corps must be trained and equipped for landing on hostile shores, often on open beaches and resist serious opposition."[19] Using the lessons taken from the Gallipoli campaign, the Marine Corps schools embarked upon their efforts to develop the doctrine and tactics that would ultimately be employed in World War II and later.

Conclusion

Through World War I, naval and joint landing operations exhibited a few important characteristics. Operations by the United States Marine Corps were clearly an adjunct to Navy operations. Landing forces were usually comprised of both Marines and Sailors, and were frequently under the direct command of Navy officers. Command relationships were

obviously not an issue; the commander of the Navy squadron involved was in overall command.

Joint Army and Navy operations were a different story. Typically, the Army procured its own transport ships and exercised overall command over the transport fleet as well as the landing force. The Navy generally provided support: convoy escort, shore bombardment, and occasionally, the landing ships and craft to take the troops ashore. While early operations were by and large successful, command relationships were not defined, and cooperation between the services was lacking.

Most importantly, American landing operations prior to World War II faced little or no resistance from the enemy on shore. What resistance there was typically could be suppressed or scattered by shore bombardment. For this reason, such operations are more appropriately referred to as landing operations, as opposed to the amphibious assaults that would become familiar in World War II.

The American operations in the Spanish-American War and the British experience at Gallipoli proved that formal doctrine and tactics would be required if amphibious operations were to remain viable. The following chapter will examine the development of that doctrine, focusing on the evolution of command relationships.

[1]William L. Rogers, *Greek and Roman Naval Warfare* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1964), 16.

[2]Ibid., 24.

[3]LtGen Holland M. Smith, "The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy, Part II" *Marine Corps Gazette* 32 (July 1946): 27.

[4]Ibid., 29.

[5]Graham A. Cosmas and Jack Shulimson, "The Culebra Maneuver and the Formation of the U.S. Marine Corps's Advance Base Force, 1913-14," *Changing Interpretations and New Sources in Naval History*, ed. Robert W. Love Jr., (New York and London: Garland, 1980), 293-308; in Merrill L. Bartlett, *Assault from the Sea* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1983), 121.

[6]John Fleming Polk, "Vera Cruz, 1847: A Lesson in Command," *Marine Corps Gazette* 63 (September 1979): 62.

[7]Joseph E. King, "The Fort Fisher Campaigns, 1864-65," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* 77 (August 1951): 846.

[8]Ibid., 849.

[9]William F. Atwater, "United States Army and Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations, 1898-1942" (Doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1986), 10-11.

[10]Louis J. Gulliver, "Sampson and Shafter at Santiago" United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* 65 (June 1939): 800.

[11]Ibid., 799.

[12]Phillip A. Crowl, "Command Relationships in Amphibious Warfare" lectures at Quantico, VA, 1959-60, Historical Amphibious File, Marine Corps University Archives, Quantico, VA, 4.

[13]Ibid.

[14]W. F. Fullam, "Co-ordinating the Army and Navy," United States Naval Institute *Proceedings* 50 (January 1924): 14.

[15]William R. Griffiths, "The Dardanelles and Gallipoli," *The Great War*, ed. Thomas E. Griess, The West Point Military History Series (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, Inc., 1986), 83-87; excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, *C600 Term 1 Syllabus/Book of Readings* (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, July 1999), 567.

[16]T. A. Gibson, "Eyeless in Byzantium: The Tragedy of Ian Hamilton," *Army Quarterly* 91 (October 1965): 87.

[17]James B. Agnew, "From where did our amphibious doctrine come?" *Marine Corps Gazette* 63 (August 1979): 55.

[18]Douglas MacArthur, *MacArthur on War: His Military Writings*, ed. Frank C. Waldrop (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1943), 345.

[19]Robert H. Dunlap, "Lessons for Marines from the Gallipoli Campaign," *Marine Corps Gazette* 6 (September 1921): 237.

CHAPTER 3

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMAND RELATIONS DOCTRINE FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Introduction

Through World War I, the United States military had no specifically developed doctrine with which to conduct amphibious operations of the type soon to be required in World War II. Up to that point, amphibious operations had essentially been unopposed landing operations. That is to say, whether the landing force involved the Army or Marine Corps, such operations typically involved movement of troop ships to the landing area under escort of the Navy, transport of the landing force to an unopposed beach, and finally, the conduct of land operations with support of naval bombardment. The Navy had instruction manuals for landing parties, developed in the late 1800s, which "were mainly concerned with infantry drill and operating in extended order."[1] These publications did not attempt to address the issues of command relations between the Navy force and the landing force.

The remainder of this chapter will look at the major publications that were developed to govern employment of Army and naval (Navy and Marine Corps) forces in amphibious operations. The Army and Navy, under direction of the Joint Board, produced a number of instructions and manuals

governing the conduct of joint operations. While the first few of these did not specifically concern amphibious operations, they did lay the groundwork for the command relations between the services in joint operations. The Joint Board, in fact, produced the first doctrinal manual on amphibious operations, *Joint Overseas Expeditions*, in 1933. The Marine Corps, in 1934, developed the *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations*. Although this manual came after *Joint Overseas Expeditions*, it is largely credited as being the first doctrine for amphibious operations, as it developed most of the tactical and technical procedures to be used. The Navy and Army later adopted the Marine Corps manual, with minor changes, as their doctrine for amphibious operations.

Joint Army and Navy Doctrine

Joint doctrine concerning command relationships began in 1906 with rather vague rules designed to manage convoy operations. Doctrine was later developed to govern coastal defense and then expanded to include joint operations in general. In 1933, joint doctrine specifically addressing amphibious-type operations was published. The following sections will look at command relations in these

publications, beginning with the *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition*.

The Joint Board, established largely as a result of the lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy in the Spanish-American War, promulgated the *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition* on 25 February 1906, which were subsequently revised in 1917. These regulations were applicable only when the Navy was required to provide escort for a convoy of Army transports.

The 1906 version authorized the Navy to provide a convoy commander, who essentially would be responsible for the defense of the convoy, including the steaming formation, and also support of the Army landing force, including naval gunfire and assistance with the landing. The assigned Army commander was responsible for all else, including destination, time of sailing, and any changes necessary in the plan or destination enroute. After consulting with the Navy commander, the Army commander also decided the time, place, and order of landing. While the *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition* did not specifically assign overall command, the authority and responsibilities assigned meant that the Army commander "in all essential aspects was the overall commander of the expedition."[2]

The revised *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition* of 1917 provided significant changes in assignment of responsibilities. The Navy commander would now receive orders from the Navy department as to a jointly determined destination and approximate departure date, and would issue sailing orders once the Army was ready. The Navy commander also now determined the time and beaches for the landing and would continue to assist the Army with the landing. The Army commander retained responsibility for assigning landing sequence. In the revised *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition*, "The question of command in joint landing operations was settled in favor of the Naval commander."[3]

Although the *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition* spelled out the authority and responsibility of each commander for this limited type of joint operation, the publication did not actually assign overall command responsibility, instead relying on the traditional "generous cooperation" between the services. To effect such cooperation, the *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition* stated, "It is deemed desirable that the Army Commanding Officer shall, if convenient, be embarked in the flagship of the Naval Convoy Commander."[4]

Three years after the revision to the *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition*, the Joint Board developed the first truly doctrinal publication to take up command relationships, *Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense*.

In 1920, the War and Navy departments issued the publication *Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense*. While this publication was primarily occupied with the concerns of coastal defense, a concept for cooperation between the Army and Navy commanders called paramount interest was introduced.

When an enemy force greatly superior to the naval force approached the coast the Army had paramount interest in the operation, which included responsibility for coordinating the operations of naval forces. Conversely, when the naval force was near equal in strength to the enemy, the Navy had paramount interest, and would coordinate operations of the Army forces.[5]

The next joint doctrinal publication to be issued was *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*. This document covered all operations involving Army and Navy forces, not only coastal defense.

Joint Action of the Army and the Navy was prepared by the Joint Board and approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy on 23 April 1927, superceding and canceling *Joint*

Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense. When originally issued, this publication did not include much more guidance and information than *Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense*; however, it was issued with an outline of chapters to be included at future dates. Command relationships for joint operations were addressed in Chapter II, "The Coordination of Operations of the Army and the Navy."

Joint Action of the Army and the Navy defined joint operations as those "usually requiring tactical coordination, conducted by forces of the Army and Navy for the accomplishment of a common mission," and delineating five classes of joint operations:

> (a) Joint overseas movements.
> (b) Landing attacks against shore objectives.
> (c) Attacks against a shore objective by land and sea.
> (d) Coast defense.
> (e) Special situations where Army forces operate with Navy forces to accomplish a mission (task) which is normally a function of the Navy, and vice versa.[6]

This publication, however briefly, for the first time assigned tasks to the Army and Navy for landing operations. Additional details were anticipated to be included later in Chapter VI, "Offensive Operations."

Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense introduced the principle of coordination under paramount interest. *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* expanded upon this method of coordination. Under paramount interest,

"authority and responsibility for the coordination are vested in the commander of the force whose function and requirements are, at the time, of the greater importance."[7] The commander having paramount interest was authorized and required to designate missions for the for the Army and Navy forces participating in the operation. The commander not having paramount interest was required to subordinate his operations to the operations of the commander with paramount interest; however, he did not relinquish actual command of his force. Additionally, the commander with paramount interest was responsible to determine which force had paramount interest in any subordinate operations.

Joint Action of the Army and the Navy also introduced into doctrine a new method of coordination, the exercise of unity of command. Under this concept, the president, "as Commander in Chief may delegate his authority, in so far as concerns the exercise of command over forces engaged in joint operations, by the appointment of either an Army or naval officer to exercise such command."[8] In addition to assigning missions, the designated commander had the authority to organize task forces, designate objectives, provide logistic support, and exercise control over forces in the progress of the operation. This last facet did not include authority to direct dispositions or methods of

operation for missions that were assigned exclusively to the other service. *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* also introduced the idea that a commander exercising unity of command "shall have a headquarters separate and distinct from those of the commanders of the forces of the two services."[9] Similarly to paramount interest, a commander exercising unity of command could delegate his authority appointing a subordinate commander to exercise unity of command over a task force, or to designate paramount interest for a subordinate operation.

As directed by *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, war plans were to stipulate the method of coordination, either paramount interest or unity of command, to be employed in each phase of the operation. The plans were also to specify either which service had paramount interest or whether an Army or Navy officer was to exercise unity of command. Since the Joint Board had responsibility for developing war plans, they were therefore also responsible for determining the method of coordination and the service that had paramount interest or whose officer would exercise unity of command.

The concept of unity of command in joint operations did not fare particularly well in practice during this period. "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan--Orange" of 12 March

1924 had determined that the Navy had paramount interest in the initial and second phases (the primarily maritime phases) of the operation. The plan went so far as to require "that all Army and Navy forces employed therein form one command and that its commander have the whole responsibility and full power to carry out operations."[10] Further, this single command, designated Unites States Asiatic Expeditionary Forces, would be commanded by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, later known as the Pacific Fleet. Shortly thereafter, the Joint Board directed that the plan be changed, now to employ "the principle of thorough cooperation between the two services,"[11] as they did not agree with the application of unity of command. Following publication of *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, with the inclusion of paramount interest as the preferred command relationship, the Joint Board promulgated a revised "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan--Orange". The updated plan stated, "Coordination of all Forces operating within the Principal Theater of Operations shall be exercised under the PRINCIPLE OF PARAMOUNT INTEREST VESTED IN THE NAVY UNTIL OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY THE PRESIDENT."[12]

Joint Action of the Army and the Navy was revised in 1935, retaining the principles of paramount interest and

unity of command. This revision slightly reworded the definition of paramount interest, without changing its meaning. It also introduced the concept that the commander of the service with paramount interest would exercise limited unity of command. This did not change the authority, responsibilities, or limitations of that commander.

In 1938, the Chief of Naval Operations and acting Secretary of the Navy Admiral William D. Leahy, and the Chief of Staff of the Army General Malin Craig, exchanged letters regarding the question of command as put forth in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.* Admiral Leahy, citing Navy policy, U.S. law, and perceived difficulty in execution, recommended a change to mutual cooperation as the method of coordination, with unity of command reserved for "specific operations or expeditions, which are specially organized for a particular service."[13] General Craig agreed with Admiral Leahy's proposal and recommended to the Joint Board that they change *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.*[14] The change that was issued specified, "Operations of Army and Navy forces will normally be coordinated by mutual cooperation."[15] Unity of command remained an option when the situation was deemed to call for unity of command

and ordered by the president or was agreed to by the secretaries or the commanders involved in the operation.

This was the last change to the doctrine governing command relationships between the Army and Navy prior to World War II. The experience of actual operations in the war, which will be discussed in the next chapter, led to the next change in command relationships doctrine, although such change was not effected until near the end of the war. In June 1945, the Joint Board approved a recommendation from the Army and Navy Staff College. Joint operations in peacetime could still be coordinated under mutual cooperation. The change altered terminology slightly, now providing that "operations of Army and Navy forces in times of war will normally be coordinated by the exercise of unified command."[16] Under such a command relationship, Army and Navy forces would comprise a single command unit, that is, a joint force, commanded by an officer specifically assigned by higher authority. As with the previous designation of unity of command, it was preferred that a commander exercising unified command would be separate from the commanders of the participating Army and Navy forces, unless authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other higher authority. With this change, the principle of

paramount interest as a means for determining the command relationship was removed from doctrine.

One additional point of interest was a result of Fleet Landing Exercise Number 4, conducted in the Caribbean from January to March 1938. The forces participating in the exercise were under the overall command of a Navy admiral, with a Marine Corps general in command of the landing force. An Army brigade was included in the landing force. Following the landing, the Navy commander shifted command ashore, as a favor to allow the Army brigade commander the opportunity to exercise his staff in land operations. This event was not among the objectives of the exercise; however, it was included in the Navy's report on the exercise "as a viable alternative to the current doctrine of having the admiral or commodore of the naval force exercise control over the shore operations as well as the naval activities."[17] The concept of transferring control of operations to the ground force commander would later come up as a result of operations on Guadalcanal, as will be seen in the next chapter.

The doctrine proposed to fill Chapter VI of *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* was initially published in 1933 as a stand-alone publication, *Joint Overseas Expeditions*. Although limited in detail, this provided the

first doctrine for what are now known as amphibious operations.

The Joint Board issued *Joint Overseas Expeditions* on 12 January 1933 "to present a set of general principles for the planning and conduct of joint overseas operations in order to insure the most effective cooperation and coordination between Army and Navy forces participating therein."[18] It was not included as Chapter VI of *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* 1927 as originally intended, due to the classified nature of the publication; however, it was included in the 1935 revision to *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*. A Joint Overseas Expedition was specifically defined as "a combined Army and Navy force dispatched to a theater of operations by sea for the purpose of undertaking military operations on shore."[19]

In discussing command relationships, *Joint Overseas Expeditions* stated that the authority directing the undertaking of such an expedition would prescribe the method of coordination, either under the principle of paramount interest or as unity of command. Additionally, such designation was to be delineated by phase of the operation. For specifics regarding the method of coordination, *Joint Overseas Expeditions* referred back to *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*.

The assigned commander would issue instructions, after consultation with the other commanders, which would include additional missions for either component, selection of landing areas, times for embarkation, departure, and landing, and any alternate plans. Interestingly, later in the publication, the Army commander is given authority to make the final decision as to specific landing areas, "since tactical considerations governing the employment of the troops on shore are paramount."[20] Such wording perhaps implyied that the Army commander would have paramount interest at least during the landing phase.

With *Joint Overseas Expeditions* officially being included as Chapter VI of *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, such operations would more clearly be governed by the command relationships set forth in Chapter II. The 1938 change to *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* therefore meant that, entering World War II, the doctrinal command relationship between Army and Navy forces engaged in amphibious operations would be mutual cooperation.

Naval Doctrine

Formal naval doctrine for Navy and Marine Corps operations was developed primarily through efforts of the Marine Corps Schools. The process for development began

before publication of *Joint Overseas Expeditions*, but was not completed until the year after the joint doctrine was issued. The naval doctrine originated with a Marine Corps "tentative" publication and its revision. The Marine Corps document was then adopted by the Navy, who eventually published the doctrine as an official fleet training publication.

From the end of World War I, the Marine Corps Schools devoted significant effort to the study of landing operations, concentrating heavily on correcting the problems noted in the Gallipoli campaign, as discussed in the previous chapter. In 1931, the Commandant Marine Corps Schools appointed a board of one Navy and three Marine Corps officers to draft a text on landing operations.[21] The Commandant of the Marine Corps concurred with this effort, noting that "a reasonably complete doctrine including both Marine Corps and Naval duties can be evolved."[22] Efforts to this end were delayed for the next two years by mobilization of the Marine Corps for contingency operations in Nicaragua and Cuba.

October 1933 brought about renewed emphasis on completing the landing doctrine, to the extent that the Commandant Marine Corps Schools suspended all classes, in order that staff and students could put full-time energy

into the effort.[23] In developing the *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations*, the Marine Corps certainly recognized the existence and importance of *Joint Overseas Expeditions*. At a January 1934 conference for development of their doctrine, Colonel Ellis B. Miller, the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools, stated:

> The Marine Corps Schools must accept this pamphlet and deviate from the principles and doctrine prescribed therein only after due deliberation and a firm belief that the Marine Corps Schools in collaboration with FMF are right, and the Joint Board is wrong; and any such decision must be referred to the Major General Commandant before final inclusion in our manual.[24]

The conference did, however, highlight "clearly and emphatically that Marine-Naval operations were not Joint operations in the manner referred to in the Joint Board pamphlet, but that we represented a part of a unified Naval force."[25]

The *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations* describes a naval overseas expedition as a Naval Attack Force, normally comprised of the landing force and naval supporting groups. As a unified naval operation, *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations* specifically assigned overall command of the Naval Attack Force "to a flag officer of the Navy who will direct the employment of all forces participating in the landing operation."[26] Such command included the approval of the Marine's scheme of maneuver by the Navy commander. In

addition, *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations* made the Marine commander of the landing force responsible to the Navy commander "for the land operations, and for subsequent operations on shore incident to the accomplishment of the mission assigned."[27] Although the Navy commander was overall responsible for the operation, the *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations* was clear in stating, "*It must be thoroughly understood that the landing force is engaged in the main effort* and all other naval arms during that critical period are acting in support of the troops engaged in that effort."[28]

The Marine Corps revised the *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations* in 1935 under the title *Tentative Landing Operations Manual*. While the revised manual made a number of technical changes, it did not alter the command relationships between the commander of the Naval Attack Force and the commander of the Landing Force. The Marine commander would be responsible to the Navy commander for the duration of the operation.

The Marine Corps initiated naval doctrine development with their "tentative" manuals. The Navy soon accepted the latter of these manuals, publishing it as the *Landing Operations Doctrine*.

In 1937, the Navy redrafted the Marine Corps' *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* as the *Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1937*. The following year the publication was reissued as *Fleet Training Publication (FTP) 167, Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1938*. FTP 167 officially superseded the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual*, and all copies of the latter were ordered destroyed.[29]

As with the Marine Corps' revision of their original *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations*, a number of mainly technical changes were incorporated into the naval doctrine with each republication. The doctrine for command relationships, however, remained unchanged, "since the Fleet Marine Force was an organic part of the Navy, there was no problem of unified command."[30] A Navy officer would be in overall command of the Naval Attack Force, with a Marine Corps officer in charge of the Landing Force reporting to him.

Joint Army and Navy operations were intended to be conducted under the joint doctrine. However, this doctrine was not as detailed as the naval doctrine. The Army saw the need for more comprehensive instructions and published their own field manual for landing operations.

Army Doctrine

As the war in Europe grew, the Army and Navy again looked to conduct amphibious training. The Joint Board issued a "Joint Plan for Army and Navy Amphibious Training" in June 1941, providing for a Navy fleet, with a landing force composed of an Army division and Marine division.

During preliminary training for the exercise, the Army realized the need for instructional material. The Navy provided FTP 167, which the Army converted into Field Manual (FM) 31-5, *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores.* Changes were made to the Navy doctrine, deleting areas concerning only the Navy and adding information on the debarkation of animals. Otherwise, the Army field manual was a direct copy of the Navy doctrine.[31]

Conclusion

This chapter has explored the evolution of doctrine for command relationships in amphibious operations. For operations involving Army and Navy forces, the Joint Board first developed rules and doctrine for specific circumstances, the *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition* and *Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense.* Following a number of revisions, *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, which included the publication *Joint Overseas*

Expeditions, established mutual cooperation as the normal command relationship between Army and Navy officers in joint landing operations, with unified command as an option when warranted or directed.

The Marine Corps developed a more comprehensive doctrine for amphibious operations than that contained in *Joint Overseas Expeditions*, although the latter was employed as a starting point for the Marine Corps doctrine. This doctrine, which began as *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations* and was then adopted by the Navy as FTP 167 and the Army as FM 31-5, specifically designated a Navy officer as the overall commander of the Naval Attack Force. The landing force commander was responsible to the Navy commander for the conduct of operations ashore. Such a relationship was basically similar to the unified command principle of *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*. However, the naval doctrine did not call for the overall commander to have a separate headquarters from that of the commanders of the Navy and Marine Corps forces. This relationship was arrived at due to the fact that the Marine Corps was part of the Navy, and specifically, the Fleet Marine Force, which would conduct landing operations, was an element of the fleet.

The next chapter will study the application of command relationships doctrine in World War II and Korea. Three case studies: the campaigns at Guadalcanal, Okinawa, and Inchon, will be examined to determine what type of command relationship was employed, and whether any particular lessons were learned that would be applied to future operations.

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[1]William F. Atwater, "United States Army and Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations, 1898-1942" (Doctoral dissertation, Duke University, 1986), 14.

[2]Ibid., 24.

[3]Ibid., 25.

[4]Joint Board, *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition*, 25 February 1906, Joint Board No. 325, Serial 33, National Archives Microfilm Publication M1421 (Washington: The National Archives and Records Administration, 1986), 3.

[5]Joint Board, *Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), 14-15.

[6]Joint Board, *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1927), 10-11

[7]Ibid., 4.

[8]Ibid., 5.

[9]Ibid., 5.

[10]Joint Board, "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan--Orange", March 12, 1924, Joint Board No. 325, Serial 228, National Archives Microfilm Publication M1421 (Washington: The National Archives and Records Administration, 1986), 3.

[11]"Memorandum for the Joint Planning Committee--Army", July 10, 1924, Joint Board No. 325, Serial 228, National

Archives Microfilm Publication M1421 (Washington: The National Archives and Records Administration, 1986).

[12]Joint Board, "Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan--Orange", June 14, 1928, Joint Board No. 325, Serial 280, National Archives Microfilm Publication M1421 (Washington: The National Archives and Records Administration, 1986), 8. Emphasis in original.

[13]Acting Secretary of the Navy Admiral William D. Leahy to Chief of Staff of the Army General Malin Craig, 21 March 1938, Joint Board No. 350, Serial 628, National Archives Microfilm Publication M1421 (Washington: The National Archives and Records Administration, 1986).

[14]Chief of Staff of the Army General Malin Craig to Acting Secretary of the Navy Admiral William D. Leahy, 3 June 1938, Joint Board No. 350, Serial 628, National Archives Microfilm Publication M1421 (Washington: The National Archives and Records Administration, 1986).

[15]Joint Board, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935--Revision of Chapter II," 29 June 1938, Joint Board No. 350, Serial 628, National Archives Microfilm Publication M1421 (Washington: The National Archives and Records Administration, 1986).

[16]Joint Board, "Revision of Chapter II, 'Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935'," 21 June 1945, Joint Board No. 350, Serial 628, National Archives Microfilm Publication M1421 (Washington: The National Archives and Records Administration, 1986).

[17]Atwater, 106-107.

[18]Joint Board, *Joint Overseas Expeditions* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1933), 1.

[19]Ibid., 3.

[20]Ibid., 27

[21]The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools to The Major General Commandant [Marine Corps], 5 October 1931, Historical Amphibious File, Marine Corps University Archives, Quantico, VA.

[22]The Major General Commandant [Marine Corps] to The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, 20 October 1931, Historical Amphibious File, Marine Corps University Archives, Quantico, VA.

[23]Atwater, 79.

[24]"Marine Corps Schools Conference on the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations", minutes of conference held at the Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, VA, 9 January 1934, Historical Amphibious File, Marine Corps University Archives, Quantico, VA, appendix B, 1.

[25]Ibid, appendix A, 2.

[26]U.S. Marine Corps Schools, *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations*, para. 1-29.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid., para. 1-32. Emphasis in original.

[29]The Major General Commandant to The Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, 28 November 1938, Historical Amphibious File, Marine Corps University Archives, Quantico, VA.

[30]LtGen Holland M. Smith, "The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U.S. Navy, Part II," *Marine Corps Gazette* 32 (August 1946): 46.

[31]Atwater, 144-146.

CHAPTER 4

THE APPLICATION OF AMPHIBIOUS COMMAND RELATIONS DOCTRINE

Introduction

In the previous chapters, the methods of coordinating landing operations prior to World War II and the development of doctrine that would govern landing or amphibious operations during World War II were examined. Prior to World War II, landing operations that were naval only, that is, those including only the Navy and Marine Corps, were clearly coordinated under unity of command, as they were adjuncts to overall naval operations. Doctrine for joint operations, those involving the Navy and the Army, called for coordination normally through mutual cooperation, although *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* allowed for unity of command in special, although not specifically defined, cases.

This chapter will investigate the employment of the command relationship doctrine as it was applied in two World War II amphibious operations and the amphibious operation at Inchon in the Korean War. Guadalcanal is of interest as it is the first large-scale amphibious operation conducted by the United States in World War II. As such, it was the true test bed for the doctrine and tactics that had been developed over the past decades. The last large-scale

amphibious operation of World War II was conducted at Okinawa, and it was also a joint operation, involving a large Army portion of the landing force. Conducted almost three years after Guadalcanal, Okinawa allows us to review any changes to command relations made during the war. Finally, Inchon can be considered the last large-scale amphibious operation that the United States has conducted. It also allows for interpretation of any significant changes made to command relations following World War II.

Guadalcanal--1942

The first major amphibious operation of World War II, Operation WATCHTOWER, provided a trial by fire for the amphibious doctrine developed during the interwar period. Planned as the first step of an overall campaign to capture Rabaul, WATCHTOWER was planned and executed extremely rapidly, with only about five weeks between the execute order and D day, the scheduled date for the assault. Such haste was required in order to take advantage of naval victories at Midway and Coral Sea and to prevent the Japanese from establishing airfields in the Southern Solomon Islands, which would threaten the allied sea lines of communication to the Southwest Pacific.

Due to the "Europe first" strategy of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, this first offensive operation in the Pacific theater would be conducted solely with ground forces available in theater, the First Marine Division. The Division assembled in Wellington, New Zealand, with some units still enroute from San Diego when the execute order was given, and other units that would not arrive until the rehearsal a week and one-half before D day. At Wellington, all the amphibious ships had to be combat loaded.

On 22 July the fleet sortied for Koro in the Fiji Islands for a rehearsal. Upon arrival, the major commanders of the operation met for the first time as a group. This meeting was described as animated and acrimonious.[1] At this meeting, Rear Admiral Richmond Turner and Major General Alexander Vandegrift found out that their required five days of air cover to support landing and unloading operations was to be reduced to three days. For many reasons, including weather and hydrography, the rehearsal was ended with only about one third of the landing force ashore. On 31 July, the fleet sailed for the Solomon Islands.

Following naval and air bombardment, elements of the First Marine Division landed on the islands of Tulagi, Gavutu-Tanambogo, and Guadalcanal on the morning of 7 August. Figure 3a shows the approach of the two landing groups. The

landing areas and initial movements on Guadalcanal are shown in figure 3b. By the end of 8 August, the smaller islands were under control and the nearly completed airfield on Guadalcanal had been secured, with a defensive perimeter established. Air raids by the Japanese on 7 and 8 August prompted Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher to withdraw his ships providing protection for the amphibious operation on the night of 8 August, forcing Rear Admiral Turner to also withdraw his amphibious shipping the following morning. Major General Vandegrift found this decision "most alarming."[2] The Marines quickly brought the airfield, to be named Henderson Field, to operational capability, relying extensively on captured supplies. This somewhat offset the deficiencies in naval air cover, which would again be withdrawn in September.

The next few months saw the Marines maintaining and expanding their defensive perimeter against Japanese reinforcements brought in by the Tokyo Express. In late November and early December, the U.S. Army XIV Corps relieved the First Marine Division. The superior Army forces were able to commence offensive operations, forcing Japanese evacuation of Guadalcanal. By 9 February 1943, the island was secure.



Figure 3a.



Figure 3b.

Figure 3. Objectives and landing areas for Operation WATCHTOWER. Source: Henry I. Shaw Jr. "First Offensive: The Marine Campaign for Guadalcanal" [online]; available from http://metalab.unc.edu/hyperwar/USMC/USMC-C-Guadalcanal.html; Internet; accessed 2 May 2000.

The question of command relations for Operation WATCHTOWER began at the highest theater level. Since the assault would be a naval operation, Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Operating Areas, naturally desired that the operation be conducted under Navy command. However, because the Solomon Islands were situated within General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Operating Area, General George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, and General MacArthur felt that the Army, through General MacArthur, should exercise theater command. Eventually, Admiral King and General Marshall compromised, allowing the Navy, through Admiral Nimitz, to command WATCHTOWER, while the Army, through General MacArthur, would command later stages of the campaign to take Rabaul.

Once the issue of theater command had been resolved, Admiral Nimitz delegated overall command of the operation to Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Commander in Chief South Pacific, and assigned the naval forces of Vice Admiral Fletcher's Task Force 61 to the operation. Rear Admiral Turner would command the amphibious portion of the operation, with the amphibious Attack Force designated Task Force 62. In accordance with the naval doctrine of FTP 167, the Landing Force, commanded by Major General Vandegrift,

fell under the command of Rear Admiral Turner. Figure 4 outlines the overall command relationships for Operation WATCHTOWER. Rear Admiral Turner would retain command of the amphibious forces throughout the operation. This meant that he retained authority and responsibility for ground operations, as well as naval operations supporting the landing force. While this relationship between Rear Admiral Turner and Major General Vandegrift was in accordance with naval doctrine, providing unquestionable unity of command, it did not exactly fit the description of unity of command established in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*. For example, Rear Admiral Turner exercised his authority to reorganize elements of the landing force. Also, Vice Admiral Fletcher, clearly holding unity of command above Rear Admiral Turner, did not meet the notion of a joint force commander, with a joint staff, to whom the Navy and landing force commanders would report. Only Rear Admiral Turner was subordinate to Vice Admiral Fletcher throughout the operation, Major General Vandegrift remained subordinate to Rear Admiral Turner in accordance with the naval doctrine.

Other commanders of interest included Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, commander of Task Force 61.1 (Air Support Force), in charge of the aircraft carrier groups providing



Figure 4. Command organization for Operation WATCHTOWER.

air support and defense. Rear Admiral Noyes reported directly to Vice Admiral Fletcher. Rear Admiral John McCain, Task Force 63 (Aircraft South Pacific), was in command of land-based air support within the South Pacific area. He reported to Vice Admiral Ghormley.

As expected from the first employment of an amphibious force on such a large-scale, the Navy and Marine Corps developed numerous lessons from Operation WATCHTOWER, not the least of which involved command relations. Despite the problems encountered, much did go right at Guadalcanal, and it was widely felt that the operation to a major degree validated the doctrine and tactics that had been developed.

A glaring deficiency was the relationship between commanders involved and their understanding of the mission. While Major General Vandegrift planned for a "normal amphibious operation premised upon a firm control of sea and air by our naval forces. The latter [Navy] however regarded the enterprise more in the nature of a large scale raid."[3] Even Major General Vandegrift did not seem to have understood the strategic importance of the operation, stating in his report:

> The decision of the United Nations to attack was based upon larger reasons unknown to this headquarters, reasons of the most compelling nature, it must be presumed, for seldom has an operation been begun under more disadvantageous circumstances.[4]

This confusion was further exacerbated by the relationship between Vice Admirals Ghormley and Fletcher. It appeared that Vice Admiral Ghormley was uncertain as to his level of authority, and did not feel that he had the authority to "interfere in the Task Force Commander's mission."[5] The fact that he did not make himself available for the meeting of commanders during the rehearsal amply displayed his reticence. This prevented him from being able to contribute to the dispute over provision of air cover for the landing and subsequent offload.

The control of covering and support forces also illuminated other problems with the command relationships in this operation. For example, a request from Major General Vandegrift for supporting land-based air would have to go up three levels of the chain of command and then down one level. Such a request would go up through Rear Admiral Turner and Vice Admiral Fletcher to Vice Admiral Ghormley, who would then direct Rear Admiral McCain to provide the support. In addition, the departure of Vice Admiral Fletcher and his covering force clearly showed that, although unity of command may have been in effect, unity of effort was lacking. Rear Admiral Turner afterward recommended that the amphibious force commander be given

operational control of all forces assigned to directly support the operation.[6]

A final issue with command relations was the relationship between the amphibious force and landing force commanders. As previously mentioned, Rear Admiral Turner maintained command over the landing force throughout. This was in accordance with doctrine, and Admiral King specified in the plan for establishing the South Pacific Amphibious Force that the commander "will be in command of the naval, ground, and air units assigned to the amphibious forces in the South Pacific area."[7] However, Rear Admiral Turner occasionally employed and reorganized Marine units in manners contrary to Major General Vandegrift's requirements and desires,[8] although the case is made that Rear Admiral Turner was employing the forces as he saw fit in accordance with higher operational plans. Major General Vandegrift reasoned that, once the landing force was established ashore, he should be able to exercise command authority over the ground operations. As mentioned in Chapter 3, such a transfer of command authority had been accomplished in 1938 during FLEX 4 in order to allow the Army commander to exercise his staff. Major General Vandegrift's recommendation was adopted as a change to FTP 167 in 1943.[9]

Okinawa--1945

The battle for Okinawa, code named Operation ICEBERG, had its roots in the strategic realization in the spring of 1943 that an invasion of the Japanese "home islands might be necessary to force Tokyo's surrender."[10] In September 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that Operation CAUSEWAY, the plan to invade Formosa, was not feasible due to insufficient ground combat troops, and was in fact unnecessary if General MacArthur was able to take Luzon in the Philippines. Luzon would be invaded in December 1944, and additional forces under Admiral Nimitz would assault Iwo Jima in January 1945, followed by Okinawa in March.

Operation ICEBERG would be a significantly larger operation than had previously been conducted during the island hopping campaign across the Pacific Ocean Area that had started with Guadalcanal in 1942. The operation to take "one or more positions in the Ryukyus called for the employment of a field army."[11] The Tenth Army would comprise the bulk of the landing force, along with the Marine Corps' III Amphibious Corps.

On 26 March 1945, the 77th Infantry Division (Reinforced) assaulted objectives in the Kerama Retto, a group of islands about ten miles west of Okinawa. This preliminary assault was necessary to provide a support area

for fuel, ammo, and seaplane basing. The thirty-first of March saw the landing of a field artillery group on Keise Shimo, a small island eight miles west of Okinawa. This field artillery group was established on the island to provide additional fire support for operations on Okinawa itself.

On L day (landing day), 1 April 1945, the Northern and Southern Attack Forces landed their troops on beaches on the western side of Okinawa. To the southeast of the island, a demonstration group with the Second Marine Division conducted a feint. Figure 5 shows the overall plan of attack. The Japanese did little to oppose the landings, such that 16,000 troops were ashore within the first hour, with 60,000 by nightfall "in what sometimes seemed like a large-scale peacetime exercise."[12] The first few days ashore saw limited resistance and rapid achieving of initial objectives, although kamikaze attacks against the fleet were increasing. For the next four months, however, Army and Marine Corps forces faced severe resistance and were required to systematically eliminate the enemy from their defensive fortifications.

The size of the force involved, the joint nature of the landing force, and an expectation that combat operations ashore so close to the Japanese home islands would be

extensive required a variation on the command relationships employed in previous amphibious operations. Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet and Central Pacific Task Forces, was designated the implementing commander for the operation, commander of Task Force 50. Vice Admiral Turner, now Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific, was Commander of the Joint Expeditionary Force, Task Force 51. Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, Commander of Tenth Army was commander of the Expeditionary Troops, Task Force 56, and reported to Vice Admiral Turner. Figure 6 diagrams these command relationships for the amphibious phase. As discussed in Chapter 3, the doctrine for command relationships between Army and Navy commanders, promulgated in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, was mutual cooperation. However, previous experience in the island-hopping campaign had proved the effectiveness of unity of command. Additionally, in August 1944, Admiral Nimitz directed that "Command Relationships in the Pacific Ocean Areas are based on unified command."[13] This directive laid out the command relationships to be employed throughout the remainder of the war in the Pacific. Included were detailed procedures for transfer of authority to the landing force commander once established ashore, which became the norm following Guadalcanal. The definitions and guidance



Figure 5. Assault plan for Operation ICEBERG. Source: Roy E. Appleman, et al., *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1948), 30.



Figure 6. Command organization for Operation ICEBERG: Amphibious Phase.

provided were used nearly verbatim in both the Tenth Army and III Amphibious Corps plans for Okinawa. The actual change to prefer unity of command in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* would not be made until 21 June 1945, after Operation ICEBERG had commenced.

The Expeditionary force was broken into subordinate attack forces, the Northern Attack Force (TF 53) and the Southern Attack Force (TF 55). Essentially, there were two subordinate amphibious operations, with associated command relationships, imbedded within the larger amphibious operation. For each Attack Force, "the related Commander Attack Force will command the landing force through the related Commander Landing Force for ship-to-shore operations. . . . As soon as the Commander Landing Force determines that the status of the landing operations permits, he will assume command on shore and report that fact to the related Commander Attack Force."[14] The individual landing force commanders would then report directly to Lieutenant General Buckner.

As mentioned, it was anticipated that extended combat operations ashore were expected. This led to a two-phased transfer of authority for the overall operation. Once the amphibious phase of the operation was completed, Vice Admiral Turner would "when directed by Commander FIFTH

Fleet, transfer command of the RYUKYUS Area, or any defined part of it, to the Commanding General, RYUKUS Forces (CTF 99)."[15] This occurred on 17 May, in conjunction with Vice Admiral Turner's relief by Vice Admiral Harry Hill, "by which date it was considered possible to shift to Lieutenant General Buckner, Commanding General Tenth Army, responsibility for the defense and development of captured positions on Okinawa."[16] Figure 7 diagrams the post-amphibious phase command relationships.

Command of the supporting aircraft carriers fell under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher in Task Force 58, reporting to Admiral Spruance. While he did not have direct command of the carrier support, Vice Admiral Turner did exercise command over large supporting naval forces, and did not have the extra layers of command to wade through for support as at Guadalcanal.

Coming at the end of the war, relatively few lessons regarding command relationships were noted from Operation ICEBERG. Conducted following years of extensive amphibious operations, Okinawa was the pinnacle of extensive experience. If Guadalcanal was the trial by fire, then Okinawa may be considered the final exam of the war in the Pacific. To a large extent, the deficiencies observed in



Figure 7. Command organization for Operation ICEBERG: Following the Amphibious Phase.

Guadalcanal and the rest of the island hopping campaign had been corrected and lessons appropriately applied.

At the highest levels, commanders displayed exceptional cooperation. In selecting Okinawa as the appropriate objective over Formosa and in the provision of forces for the operation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, through theater commanders Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur, down to the operational commanders clearly displayed unity of effort. General MacArthur's operations to regain the Philippines had effectively cut the Japanese lines of communication to their southern resources area. This allowed for the clear identification of Okinawa as the most advantageous air and naval staging area required for eventual invasion of the Japanese home islands.

The one area of this operation that was new to amphibious warfare in the Pacific was the employment of a landing force of field army size, under the command of an Army general. Additionally, the Army commander would have a large Marine Corps force under his command. This led to the only major issues to arise with command relations in Operation ICEBERG. Early in the operation, Navy commanders felt that Lieutenant General Buckner's methodical approach was resulting in unnecessary losses at sea. At one point Admiral Nimitz told Lieutenant General Buckner "if this line

isn't moving in five days we'll get someone up here to move it so we can all get out from under these damn attacks."[17] Another area of dispute was the Marine Corps' desire to conduct additional amphibious assaults on the southeast coast of Okinawa to outflank the Japanese defenders. This did not meet with Lieutenant General Buckner's approval. When the American news media reported these disagreements, implying that Lieutenant General Buckner was being too conservative, Navy commanders from Admiral King through Vice Admiral Turner expressed their support of the Army commander. Admiral Nimitz even called a press conference where he described the Tenth Army's performance as magnificent, which "prevented a major rupture in army-navy relations."[18]

Inchon--1950

Approximately five years after the end of World War II much had changed since the completion of Operation ICEBERG. The United States' military had been drastically downsized, and questions were being raised over the appropriate missions of the various services. In the fall of 1949, General of the Army Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services committee, "I predict that large-scale amphibious operations will never

occur again."[19] More ominous was a 1949 statement by Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, that "the Navy is on its way out. . . . There's no reason for having a Navy and Marine Corps. General Bradley tells me that amphibious operations are a thing of the past. We'll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything the Navy can do nowadays, so that does away with the Navy."[20] However, the United States actually found itself again looking to the capabilities of amphibious forces to turn the tide of war. More specifically, General of the Army MacArthur, now Commander in Chief, Far East, envisioned an amphibious assault into the North Korean flank as a means to sever the North Korean lines of communication through Seoul, relieve pressure on the Eighth Army's perimeter at Pusan, regain the offensive, and ultimately "the destruction of the North Korean Army south of the line Inchon-Seoul-Utchin."[21]

There were similarities between the beginnings of Operation CHROMITE and Operation WATCHTOWER, the assault on Guadalcanal. Strategically, the United States was again focused on Europe, leading Chief of Staff of the Army General Harry Collins to tell General MacArthur, "General, you are going to have to win the war out here with the troops available to you in Japan and Korea."[22] The planning

time was also short, with the first portion of the Marine planning group arriving in Tokyo less than a month prior to D day. While Guadalcanal had an abbreviated rehearsal, the timeframe involved left no opportunity for a rehearsal for Operation CHROMITE. Finally, the assault landing force would be comprised of the First Marine Division, which had also conducted the assault on Guadalcanal.

Operation CHROMITE was originally envisioned as a landing of the 1st Cavalry Division (Operation BLUEHEARTS) on 20 July 1950; however, this became unfeasible due to the rapid advance of the North Koreans. Lieutenant General Lemuel Shepherd, Commander Fleet Marine Force Pacific, told General MacArthur at the time that he could provide the First Marine Division, which General MacArthur quickly requested from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Grave doubts existed about the feasibility of landing at Inchon, primarily due to tidal range, lack of landing beaches, and urban terrain. At a meeting 23 August, attended by Admiral Forrest P. Sherman and General Collins of the Joint Chiefs, as well as other senior commanders from the Pacific and Far East Commands, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, Commander Amphibious Group One stated, "the best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible."[23] Alternatives were proposed, but General MacArthur was convinced that

Inchon was the right answer and would not be dissuaded. His reasoning included that fact that Inchon provided the most direct access to Seoul. Secondly, other areas proposed for the assault would do little more than reinforce the Eighth Army; they would not provide the flanking attack that General MacArthur envisioned. Finally, General MacArthur foresaw that the North Koreans would not establish significant defenses in the Inchon area, for the very reason that it was not an ideal area for an amphibious assault. D day was set for 15 September, and around the clock planning continued.

Between 5 and 12 September, elements of the assault force departed Tokyo and Kobe, Japan; and Pusan, South Korea; to rendezvous off Inchon. Days of preparatory mine clearance and softening up peaked prior to dawn 15 September with extensive air and naval bombardment to prepare the landing objectives. Due to tidal constraints, the D day assault occurred in two phases. Just after dawn, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines attacked Wolmi-do, a small island commanding the inner harbor less than a mile from the main landing beaches. By shortly after noon, the initial objectives were secured.[24]

At the evening high tide, the 1st and 5th Marines landed at Blue and Red beaches in Inchon, on either side of Wolmi-do.

Figure 8 illustrates the assault plan for Operation CHROMITE. Initial objectives were taken against light resistance. On 16 September, the Marines reached the designated forward beachhead line, "and the Division command post was established ashore, in the outskirts of INCHON at 1800."[25] At little more than twenty-four hours from the main landings, the amphibious objectives had been met and transfer of authority to Major General Oliver P. Smith accomplished.

By late on 17 September (D+2), Kimpo airfield was secured by the Marines, and by the end of 19 September the Army's 7th Division was fully ashore. Major General Edward M. Almond, Commanding General, X Corps, assumed command of land operations on 21 September. Through the following week, against frequently heavy resistance, the Marines and Soldiers of X Corps fought their way to Seoul, which was officially held 28 September (D+13).[26]

The command relations for Operation CHROMITE were broken down by phase of the operation. Throughout, General MacArthur was the theater commander as Commander in Chief, Far East. In the planning phase, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, Commander Navy Far East, and Major General Almond, Commanding General X Corps, reported to General MacArthur as his immediate subordinates. Of interest is that Major



Figure 8. Assault plan for Operation CHROMITE. Source: Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953*, vol. 2, *The Inchon-Seoul Operation* (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1955), 68.

General Arnold was also General MacArthur's Chief of Staff for the Far East Command and retained that position through Operation CHROMITE. Rear Admiral Doyle, Commander Amphibious Group One, and Major General Smith, Commanding General First Marine Division, were under Vice Admiral Joy as coequals for planning. The planning phase command relationships are outlined in figure 9. This status of the amphibious commanders in the planning phase had been established prior to Okinawa.

For the embarkation and assault phase, General MacArthur established Joint Task Force (JTF) 7, under the command of Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, Commander Seventh Fleet. Vice Admiral Doyle assumed command of the Attack Force, Task Force 90, under JTF 7. The X Corps also now came under JTF 7 command, as did Rear Admiral Edward C. Ewen's Fast Carrier Group, Task Force 77, and Rear Admiral George R. Henderson's Patrol and Reconnaissance Force, Task Force 99. Reporting to Rear Admiral Doyle was the landing force, broken into two Task Groups, 92.1 (First Marine Division) and 92.2 (7th Infantry Division). Figure 10 outlines the embarkation and assault phase command relationships.

In the final phase, exploitation, JTF 7 was dissolved, with Major General Almond's X Corps reporting directly to



Figure 9. Command organization for Operation CHROMITE: Planning Phase. The dotted lines indicate coordination.



Figure 10. Command organization for Operation CHROMITE: Amphibious Phase.

General MacArthur. The First Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division were now incorporated into X Corps. The exploitation phase command relationships are outlined in figure 11.

These command relations show some differences from those employed in Operation ICEBERG. Obviously the first is the establishment of a JTF commander. While this was new terminology, the position of a joint force commander was recommended in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*. The second difference was that the titles of Expeditionary Force and Expeditionary Troops, employed at Okinawa and prior, were not used. It appears, however, that Rear Admiral Doyle and Major General Smith in reality, if not in name, filled these positions.

In all, the command relationships for the amphibious assault on Inchon followed established doctrine. Perhaps the best description of command relationship issues comes from Major General Smith's after action report, in which he commented:

> Although the relationship between this division as Landing Force and Phib Group ONE as Attack Force was clear from the out-set and in accordance with doctrine, the command status and command responsibilities for the assault landing phase of CG X Corps, CJTF 7, (Com 7th Fleet) and COMNAVFE were vague and confusing. None of the latter commands ever appeared under well defined titles and none of the accepted titles which would have been appropriate to these echelons was used.[27]



Figure 11. Command organization for Operation CHROMITE: Exploitation Phase.

Obviously the difference in command lexis did lead to some confusion. However, other areas identified by Major General Smith require additional remarks.

The establishment of X Corps headquarters raised issues prior to the operation as well. Many argued that Lieutenant General Shepherd, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific, should be given the Corps command for Operation CHROMITE, as he was of the appropriate rank (lieutenant general), had an established headquarters and staff, and was experienced in amphibious warfare. General MacArthur, and Major General Arnold as his Chief of Staff, preferred an Army staff, as Operation CHROMITE would be a land operation once the amphibious phase was completed.[28] In theory, X Corps should have filled the role of Expeditionary Troops, had that term been used. Although he was embarked in Rear Admiral Doyle's flagship, Major General Almond saw his role differently; "that until the 1st Marine Division landed the X Corps had no function except to sit in observation."[29] As mentioned in the previous section, this left the role of Expeditionary Troops to Major General Smith, and obviously led in part to his confusion over command echelons.

While the JTF was a new name, this position filled the overall command position of Vice Admiral Fletcher's Task

Force 61 at Guadalcanal and Admiral Spruance's Task Force 50 at Okinawa. The inclusion of Vice Admiral Joy's Navy Far East Command in the operation appears to be similar to Vice Admiral Ghormley's place in Guadalcanal, a level of command that had been eliminated by Okinawa.

Command relations friction also existed with Eighth Army, which remained under General MacArthur's direct command. The 5th Marines had been assigned in July to Eighth Army to reinforce the Army's perimeter around Pusan. In his planning, Major General Smith realized he would require the 5th Marines for his assault, and requested their release from Major General Almond in his role as Far East Chief of Staff. Neither Major General Almond nor Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth Army commander, were receptive to the idea, but General MacArthur agreed with the Marine and Navy commanders, and told Major General Almond to "tell Walker he will have to give up the 5th Marines."[30]

Summary of Historical Analysis

From Operation WATCHTOWER at Guadalcanal, the first World War II amphibious assault in the Pacific, the Navy and Marine Corps learned a number of important lessons regarding command relations. First was that all commanders must have a clear understanding of the aims of the operation and must

put forth the required unity of effort to achieve the mission. Second, and related to the first, was that unity of command in the operation should include command of the appropriate supporting and covering forces to achieve the amphibious objectives, with unnecessary levels of command being eliminated. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it was recognized that the landing force commander needed to take command of ground operations once the amphibious phase of the operation was completed.

At Okinawa, Operation ICEBERG, the final large-scale amphibious operation executed in World War II, saw the introduction of a large joint component through the employment of a large Army-Marine Corps landing force. The lessons of Guadalcanal, and subsequent operations, were in the whole applied. Interservice cooperation, from the top levels down, reached unprecedented heights, all commanders were unified as to the ultimate goals, and a layer of command above the amphibious operation had been eliminated. Finally, transfer of authority to the ground force commander was appropriately accomplished.

Operation CHROMITE was arguably the last major amphibious assault conducted by any commander. Unfortunately, the interservice cooperation that had been achieved prior to Okinawa had been lost at the highest

levels in the years after World War II, with some even working toward the elimination of the Navy and Marine Corps. The command relations developed and perfected through World War II were effectively employed in the amphibious assault itself. Additionally, the operational commander was now identified, appropriately, as a Joint Task Force commander. However, conceivably unnecessary echelons of command above the amphibious operation itself had been reintroduced.

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[24]Ibid., 87-94.

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[27]First Marine Division, FMF, "Special Action Report," 27.

[28]Robert Debs Heinl Jr., *Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign* (Annapolis, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1979), 53-54.

[29]Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, USA (Ret.) to Colonel R.D. Heinl, USMC (Ret.), 31 August 1966, enclosure 4, Inchon File, Marine Corps University Archives, Quantico, VA.

[30]Heinl, *Victory at High Tide*, 63.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This thesis was conducted as a historical inquiry into the development of doctrine for command relationships in amphibious operations. Three case studies, Operations WATCHTOWER, ICEBERG, and CHROMITE, were analyzed to evaluate the employment of that doctrine in World War II and the Korean War. These particular case studies were chosen as the first and last major amphibious assaults of World War II and the last major amphibious assault conducted by the United States armed forces. This chapter will provide a brief review of the research conducted, focusing on the research questions posed in chapter 1. The applicability of the results of this research to today's doctrinal argument will be addressed. This chapter will conclude with recommendations for further research in this area.

Research Summary

In order to answer the overall research question, How did the doctrine for amphibious command relationships develop up to and through World War II? a number of subordinate questions were addressed. First of these questions regarded the nature of command relationships in

amphibious operations conducted by the United States prior to World War II. The United States military conducted many landing operations from the beginnings of the nation, employing both joint and naval forces. These operations were generally landing operations, not what are considered today as amphibious assaults, as they were conducted against little or no opposition. Whether the landing force was Army or Marine Corps, there was little doctrine for the forces to follow. What doctrine that did exist did not address command relationships between the Navy fleet commander and the landing force commander. In these early operations, the relationship between the commanders, and the nature of the operation itself, differed depending on which service comprised the landing force.

For joint operations, where the Army made up the landing force, the Army and Navy commanders worked under the traditional concept of cooperation. To a large extent, the character of the operation itself drove this. The Army normally procured their own transport shipping and landing boats. In these cases, the Navy assisted the operation with convoy escort, shore bombardment, and ships' boats for the landing when required. Cooperation between the commanders required them to agree on the joint aspects of the operation. However, the Army essentially conducted the

landing operation and therefore would drive required decisions.

In naval operations, the Marine Corps made up the bulk of the landing force, with reinforcement by Navy personnel when required. The landing force was generally commanded by a Marine Corps officer, but occasionally was led by a Navy officer. In both cases, the Navy fleet commander retained overall command, as the landing force was considered an integral part of the fleet.

The next question to be answered is what led to the development of doctrine covering command relationships. Two significant events directly influenced the services to codify their doctrine. First was the nearly complete lack of cooperation between the Army and Navy commanders at Santiago during the Spanish-American War. From determining the landing area, through the overall conduct of the operation to secure the port, and even to the negotiations for surrender, unresolved disagreements between the Army and Navy commanders were prevalent. Although the operation was eventually successful, it was clear that a means to ensure better cooperation was needed. This led to the establishment of the Joint Board, who would undertake the development of joint doctrine and war plans to enable cooperation between the Army and Navy.

The Marine Corps realized that their mission to seize advance bases might require them to undertake offensive landing operations against defended shores. Looking for examples of such operations, they focused on the unsuccessful British campaign in the Dardanelles during World War I. Many in the military felt that the lessons of Gallipoli, as well as the advent of airpower and submarines, proved the unfeasibility of the amphibious assault. The Marine Corps, on the other hand, believed that they could succeed by closely studying and correcting the deficiencies of Gallipoli. These efforts would include development of doctrinal materials for instruction at the Marine Corps Schools.

The next question to be addressed is the actual progression of development of command relationships in the doctrine itself. This process began with joint doctrine produced under the auspices of the Joint Board. The Marine Corps Schools undertook a more detailed approach to development of naval amphibious doctrine.

The first few publications under the Joint Board were not specifically concerned with what came to be called joint overseas expeditions, but did develop a number of concepts for command relationships. First of interest was the 1906 *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition*. This

publication did not address command relationships per se, but did establish authority and responsibility for various aspects of such expeditions. *Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense*, published in 1920, introduced the first true concept for governing the relationships between Army and Navy commanders. Called paramount interest, this concept gave overall responsibility for coordination of coastal defense operations to the service better able to control those defenses. *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* superceded *Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense* in 1927. This publication addressed attacks from the sea against shore objectives for the first time, but the chapter that would include particulars was to be published later. *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* expanded on paramount interest, providing authority and responsibility to the service whose mission had the greater importance.

The concept of unity of command was introduced into doctrine through *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*. This concept was basically a delegation of presidential authority as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. War plans developed by the Joint Board would specify the service to exercise paramount interest or the commander in whom unity of command was vested. In 1933, *Joint Overseas Expeditions*, originally intended as the previously

unpublished chapter of *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, put forth the first doctrine to explicitly govern amphibious operations. *Joint Overseas Expeditions* was incorporated into *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* in 1935, ensuring that command relationships for overseas expeditions would follow the same dictates as any joint operation. A 1938 revision to *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy* resulted in a significant change to the doctrine for command relationships. The Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the Army recommended the change based on policy, law, and expected problems with actual employment of the concepts for command relationships. This change eliminated the concept of paramount interest and reintroduced the traditional concept of mutual cooperation as the normal means for coordinating operations involving Army and Navy forces.

Naval doctrine was primarily developed through the efforts of the Marine Corps Schools in Quantico, Virginia. In 1934, one year after *Joint Overseas Expeditions* was published, the Marine Corps Schools issued the much more detailed *Tentative Manual of Landing Operations*. Command relationships clearly designated a Navy officer to exercise overall command of the Naval Attack Force. The Marine Corps landing force commander would be responsible to the Navy

commander for conduct of operations ashore. This command relationship, similar to the unity of command concept set forth in *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, was a natural extension of the fact that amphibious operations were considered unified naval operations. The Marine Corps Schools issued a revision to naval doctrine in 1935, under the title *Tentative Landing Operations Manual*. In 1937, the Navy officially adopted the doctrine as the *Landing Operations Doctrine*, which was subsequently designated as Fleet Training Publication 167 in 1938. This designation officially superceded the *Tentative Landing Operations Manual*. With minor changes, the Army adopted the naval doctrine, issuing FM 31-5, *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* in 1941.

Thus, at the onset of World War II, command relationships for amphibious operations had been set down in both joint and naval doctrine. However, these relationships had not changed significantly from what had been merely traditional through World War I. Joint operations were to normally be coordinated by mutual cooperation between the Army and Navy commanders, while naval amphibious operations remained under the overall command of a Navy officer.

Was the command relationship doctrine developed in the interwar period employed in actual operations undertaken in

World War II and Korea? The first amphibious operation of World War II, Operation Watchtower, was a naval operation. Appropriately, the command relationships for the operation followed the naval doctrine of FTP 167. Rear Admiral Richmond Turner was assigned overall command of the amphibious operation. Major General Alexander Vandegrift, the Marine Corps landing force commander, was responsible to Rear Admiral Turner, not only during the amphibious assault, but also throughout the operations ashore. Again, this command arrangement was in accordance with naval doctrine.

Operation ICEBERG, on the other hand, was a joint operation. An Army commander headed the landing force. As a joint operation, the command relationships should have been in accordance with *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, which at the start of Operation ICEBERG still called for mutual cooperation as the favored means for coordination between Army and Navy commanders. However, operational experience to that point in the war had shown the importance of unity of command, and the theater commander prescribed such a command relationship for all amphibious operations. Therefore, the Army commander, Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner, reported to the Navy commander, Vice Admiral Turner, for the amphibious phase of the operation. Even in subordinate operations, the landing force commanders

reported to the subordinate Naval Attack Force commanders until the situation allowed them to take command ashore in their respective areas. Less than three months after the commencement of Operation ICEBERG, a change was issued for *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, making unity of command the preferred relationship for joint operations in wartime. Mutual cooperation was retained as an option for peacetime joint operations.

In general, Operation CHROMITE followed the established doctrine for the amphibious phase of the operation. Rear Admiral James Doyle, the Navy commander, exercised unity of command, with the landing force commander, Marine Corps Major General Oliver Smith, reporting to him until control was established ashore. With the 1945 change to *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*, such a command relationship was in accordance with both naval and joint doctrine.

While command relations at Guadalcanal and Inchon were in accordance with established doctrine, and at Okinawa followed the directives of the theater commander, there were both positive and negative lessons from these operations. Two specific areas would lead directly to improvements in the doctrine. First was the value of unity of command. Naval doctrine entering World War II espoused unity of command, in reality if not in name. Joint doctrine would

not officially be changed until mid-1945, but the concept of unity of command was employed much earlier than that in joint amphibious operations. The second lesson was the need for a transfer of command authority from the Navy attack force commander to the landing force commander upon completion of the amphibious phase of the operation. Such a transfer was not executed in Operation WATCHTOWER, and may have resulted in less than optimum employment of landing force assets during the extended operations ashore. In Operation ICEBERG, the transfer took place a month and a half into the operation, coinciding with Vice Admiral Turner's relief as the amphibious force commander. For Operation CHROMITE, command authority was transferred the day after the initial landing. The difference in timing between Operations ICEBERG and CHROMITE can be attributed to the character of the two operations. Operation ICEBERG was an assault on a strongly defended island by a field army sized landing force, while Operation CHROMITE employed two divisions, against little initial defense, and was focused on moving further inland to Seoul.

Another primary lesson from these case studies may not have been specifically reflected in doctrinal changes, but certainly is important to any discussion of command relationships. The significance of the related concepts of

unity of effort and interservice cooperation cannot be overstated. At Guadalcanal, both were clearly lacking. Interservice non-cooperation at the strategic level nearly prevented the operation from taking place at all. A lack of unity of effort made operations ashore tenuous at best when air cover and support shipping were removed from the area. By the time of the assault on Okinawa, both unity of effort and interservice cooperation had reached their peak. This enabled an extremely difficult operation to succeed.

A final lesson that is clearly related to command relationship doctrine is the importance of the clarity with which the command relationships are described. This was emphasized by Major General Smith's report on Operation CHROMITE. He noted that the relationship between the landing force and attack force commanders was clear and in accordance with doctrine, but that other command echelons were "vague and confusing."[1] Although this thesis concentrated on the command relationships for the amphibious forces, obviously the command echelons around the amphibious operation itself are extremely critical.

Relevance to Current Doctrine

The final question that must be addressed is whether or not this process of initial doctrine development has any

applicability for the discussions on amphibious command relationships that have been ongoing for the past few years. In short, disagreement regarding the proper command relationships have stagnated a revision to Joint Publication 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*. At issue is incorporation of a supported and supporting relationship in accordance with Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, or retention of the current CATF and CLF relationship, descendent from the unity of command-type relationship of World War II. These command relationships are described in the first chapter of this thesis.

It would be extremely easy to conclude that unity of command, embodied in the CATF and CLF relationship, should be retained. Based on the evidence of the research in this thesis, unity of command became the preferred command relationship through hard experience in numerous World War II amphibious operations. It is a command relationship that was proven effective in operations from Guadalcanal to Inchon. However, Operation CHROMITE in the Korean War was the last major amphibious operation undertaken by the United States military. While there are similarities between the amphibious operations of the 1940s and 1950s and those of today, there is also much that has changed. Aviation; air defense; naval surface fire support; over-the-horizon

capability, and command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) are all greatly different and must be considered in determining command relationships. Unfortunately, the limitations of this thesis did not enable these areas to be addressed.

Perhaps the most applicable lesson for command relationships comes from Major General Smith's report on Operation CHROMITE, as discussed previously. The command structure must be clearly defined and understood at all echelons of command. Unfortunately, Joint Publication 0-2 states, "The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague, but very flexible arrangement."[2] Although flexibility may have advantages, vague command relationships may certainly lead to confusion. Therefore, if the supported and supporting command relationship is adopted for amphibious operations, the revised Joint Publication 3-02 and operations plans should clarify the command structure so that vagueness and resulting confusion is eliminated.

Recommendations for Further Study

A number of issues remain open for further research. First is to examine the historical development of the supported and supporting command relationship. The CATF and CLF relationship is obviously comparable to the unity of

command concept originally developed through *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*. Is supported and supporting similarly a follow-on to the mutual cooperation or paramount interest concepts? Has supported and supporting been effectively employed in any amphibious operations?

A second area for further research would be a closer examination of employment of command relationships doctrine in the smaller amphibious operations that have taken place since the Korean War. This could include those conducted by other nations, for example, the British operations in the Falklands War.

The influence of aviation has had a significant impact on amphibious operations following the Korean War. To that point, ship-to-shore movement had been entirely by surface means. Has this impact affected the effectiveness of command relationships for amphibious operations? Similarly, the changes previously mentioned in air defense, naval surface fire support, over-the-horizon capability, C4ISR, and any impact these changes might have had on command relationship effectiveness could be investigated.

Recently, the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the Marine Corps directed a one-year evaluation period for testing the supported and supporting command

relationship in amphibious operations. They requested special attention to the following questions:

> A. Should the Joint Force Commander (JFC) normally delegate OPCON [operational control] of the amphibious forces to a service or functional component commander? If so, which component commander?
> B. What factors should be used to determine the supported commander at various points during the amphibious operation?
> C. Should the command relationship options available to the establishing authority of an amphibious operation include OPCON, tactical control (TACON), and support as described in JP 0-2, UNAAF?
> D. Should the traditional CATF/CLF relationship remain as an option?
> E. Should the titles CATF/CLF be revised to reflect the new command relationship options?
> F. What should the normal command relationship be?[3]

Obviously, the answers to these questions will have direct influence upon the command relationships for amphibious operations. A final area for further research would be an academic study into these questions.

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[1]First Marine Division, FMF, "Special Action Report for the Inchon-Seoul Operation, 15 September-7 October 1950, Volume One," 2 May 1951, Inchon File, Marine Corps University Archives, Quantico, VA, 27.

[2]Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*, 24 February 1995, in *Joint Electronic Library* [CD-ROM] (Washington: Government Printing Office by OC Incorporated, 1999), III-10.

[3]Commandant of the Marine Corps message, CMC WASHINGTON DC 101900Z MAR 00, NAVAL COMMAND RELATIONS.

APPENDIX

COMMAND RELATIONS DOCTRINE CHRONOLOGY

Year	Publication	Notes
1886	*Naval Brigade and Operations Ashore*	1
1898	*Drill Regulations for Infantry, Artillery, and Arm and Away Boats, United States Navy*	1
1906	*Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition*	2
1917	Revised *Rules for Naval Convoy of Military Expedition*	2
1920	*Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense*	2
1927	*Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*	2
1929	Tentative *Joint Overseas Expeditions*	2
1933	*Joint Overseas Expeditions*	2
1934	*Tentative Manual of Landing Operations*	3
1935	*Tentative Landing Operations Manual*	3
1935	Revised *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*	1,7
1937	*Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1937*	3
1938	Fleet Training Publication (FTP) 167: *Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. Navy, 1938*	3
1938	Change 2 to *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*	1,5
1941	FM 31-5 *Landing Operations on Hostile Shores*	4
1945	Change 17 to *Joint Action of the Army and the Navy*	1,6

Notes:

1 Navy publication
2 Joint Army and Navy publication
3 Naval publication
4 Army publication, essentially reprint of FTP 167
5 Changes preferred command doctrine to Mutual Cooperation
6 Changes preferred command doctrine to Unity of Command
7 Includes *Joint Overseas Expeditions* as Chapter VI

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